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NOTES
REDEFINING THE HARM OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
"Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class
matter."'
-Justice Frank Murphy
"'[T]oo old, too white, too middle class' "2
-2 Live Crew's Luther Campbell
To shield a criminal defendant from compliant judges and
overzealous prosecutors, the Framers of the Bill of Rights pro-
1. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
2. Anderson, 2 Live Crew Acquittecl, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 29, 29 (quoting 2 Live
Crew's Luther Campbell). During jury selection for the trial of the musical group 2 Live
Crew, charged with obscenity for performing a song from their album, As Nasty as They
Wanna Be, defense counsel argued that the venire should not be drawn solely from voter
registration lists, but should be supplemented with telephone listings, lists of food stamp
recipients, and drivers' registration lists in order to compensate for the underrepresen-
tation of blacks and young people on voter registers. Rimer, Rap Group's Lauyer
Challenges Selection of Jury, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1990, at A16, col. 4. The population of
the trial site was 13% black, but the panel of 70 venirepersons contained only three
blacks, or 4.3%k of the venire. Id. The jury, whom singer Luther Campbell thought would
not comprehend the band's music, consisted of four white, middle-aged to elderly women,
a middle-aged black woman, and a 24-year-old white male member of a church choir.
After deliberating briefly, the jury acquitted Campbell and fellow band members of
obscenity charges. Anderson, supra, at 29.
3. Justice Byron White expounded upon the purpose of trial by jury:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect
a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants
in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our
constitutions knew from history ald experience that it was necessary to
protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies
and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority....
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge. . . . Fear of unchecked
power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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vided the criminally accused with the right to a trial "by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed."4 The Framers envisioned that the collec-
tive experience of a lay jury, the community's conscience, would
dictate guilt or innocence-not an officer of the court 5-and that
participation of the citizenry would comport with the democratic
process.6 Nevertheless, as recent Supreme Court decisions con-
tinue to suggest,7 the meaning of an "impartial jury" in an
adversarial setting varies with the goals of the parties, who seek
opposite outcomes. Inherent in the debate over a jury's appro-
priate composition is the selection process itself.
Although the sixth amendment entitles the accused to a jury
pool drawn from a cross section of the community" and the equal
protection clause prohibits the prosecution's purposeful exclusion
of jurors based on their race,9 underinclusive methods of ran-
domly assembling potential jurors'0 and tactical jury selection
may homogenize the body that ultimately determines the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence. To remove prospective jurors perceived
as sympathetic to his adversary, each litigant summarily strikes
from the venire those presumably detrimental to his own cause.
Under the pretense of assembling an impartial jury, the court-
room becomes a peculiar setting where stereotypes, the siblings
of discrimination, survive.11
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Court declared, "The purpose
of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken
prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased
response of a judge." Id. at 530 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56).
6. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 59 U.S.L.W. 4268 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1991) (No. 89-5011) ("Jury
service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties
and insures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people."); Taylor, 419 U.S. at
527 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)) (exclusion of racial groups is "at
war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government");
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (trial by jury is "the
very palladium of free government").
7. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
8. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537.
9. See, e.g., Powers, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4271; Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
10. Underinclusiveness results when the method of selection fails to encompass a broad
segment of society. For a discussion of underinclusiveness, see infra notes 175-76 and
accompanying text.
11. Last year's trial of former Washington, D.C., Mayor Marion Barry illustrates
stereotypical notions of group bias at work. The charges against Barry included possessing
cocaine and lying to a federal grand jury. At his trial, the venire comprised 15 whites
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In 1986, the Supreme Court began to harness discriminatory
challenges, as it held in Batson v. Kentucky12 that a black criminal
defendant may challenge on equal protection grounds the prose-
cution's peremptory removal of black venirepersons.13 Batson
marked the Court's first significant step in over a century toward
proscribing racial discrimination in jury selection. 14 Last Term,
the Court extended Batson's reach. In Powers v. Ohio,5 the Court
declared that a criminal defendant, regardless of his or the
removed jurors' race, may employ the equal protection clause to
challenge the race-based exclusion of the potential jurors. 16
Whether this reasoning will, and should, curb other instances of
discriminatory peremptory challenges is the focus of this Note.
This Note begins by examining briefly the jury selection proc-
ess, including the purportedly fundamental role peremptory chal-
lenges have played in assembling an impartial jury. It then
discusses Batson's effect on the challenge and explores several
issues engendered by Batson. By examining several Supreme
Court decisions on discriminatory jury selection, this Note asserts
that inclusiveness- not crude characterizations of representative-
ness-has shaped the Justices' vision of impartiality. Given the
challenged juror's right not to be discriminated against arbitrar-
ily, the inimical effect peremptory challenges have on the fair
cross section principle, and the peremptory challenge's perpetu-
ation of invidious and stereotypical notions of group bias, the
Note next advocates abolition of the peremptory challenge. Fi-
nally, the Note offers a means of assembling a more inclusive,
and consequently more representative, jury that balances the
interests of the litigants and the jurors, thus bolstering the
public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.
and 22 blacks after challenges for cause. Gellman & Thompson, Barry Jury Set, Testimony
Begins Today, Wash. Post, June 19, 1990, at Al, col. 4. Barry's counsel first peremptorily
struck two blacks, who expressed resentment during voir dire that Barry had gotten
himself into trouble in the first place. Id. The defense used its remaining challenges to
remove whites, and the prosecution used its challenges to remove only blacks. Id. The
final jury, including six alternates, consisted of 13 blacks and five whites. Id. Although
the empanelled jury was not monochromatic, the racial nature of the strikes suggests
each side's preconception of how race would influence the verdict.
12. 476 U.S. 79.
13. For a summary of the test the Court devised in Batson, see infra text accompanying
notes 55-59.
14. See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
15. 59 U.S.L.W. 4268 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1991) (No. 89-5011).
16. Id. at 4271; Batson, however, has produced a myriad of other problems that lower
courts have failed to resolve uniformly. See infra note 60.
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"[AIN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS SPECIES OF CHALLENGE"'17
Jury selection includes several phases: compilation of a com-
prehensive juror source list; random selection of a jury panel, or
venire; examination of venirepersons to eliminate anyone un-
qualified to serve; peremptory challenges; and seating of the
petit, or final, jury. Under federal law, the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968 (Act) governs jury selection. 18 A 1968 House
Report defined the goals of the Act as
(1) random selection of juror names from the voter lists of the
district or division in which court is held; and (2) determination
of juror disqualifications, excuses, exemptions, and exclusions
on the basis of objective criteria only. These principles provide
the best method for obtaining jury lists that represent a cross
section of the relevant community and for establishing an
effective bulwark against impermissible forms of discrimination
and arbitrariness. 19
Although the Act does not mandate an exclusive method of
assembling a venire, courts most frequently use voter registration
lists2° to select randomly a fair cross section of the community
where the court convenes.2' After selection of the venire, the
judge, sometimes with the assistance of counsel, conducts voir
dire to determine whether any prospective juror cannot delib-
erate impartially.22 Through challenges for cause, the attorneys
also may request the exclusion of those prospective jurors whose
answers reveal that they cannot deliberate impartially.P Follow-
ing the challenges for cause, each side may exercise a limited
17. W. BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 353 (D. Berkowitz &
S. Thorne eds. 1978).
18. 28 U.S.C. SS 1861-1869 (1988).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1792, 1793.
20. 28 U.S.C. S 1863(b)(2).
21. Id. S 1861. For a sample of how the states select prospective jurors, see infra note
173.
22. Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the examination of
venirepersons:
The court may permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the
attorney for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors
or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall
permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney for the
government to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it
deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional
questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
FED. R. CRim. P. 24(a). The trial judge may, for good cause shown, exclude any juror
from jury duty. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(4).
23. 28 U.S.C. S 1866(c)(4).
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number of peremptory challenges, or "strikes," which require no
justification before a party demands removal of a potential juror.2
"[H]unches, unsystematic past experience, intuition, [or] stabs
in the dark"' may inspire use of a peremptory challenge, which
200 years ago William Blackstone labeled "an arbitrary and
capricious species of challenge." 26 Blackstone defined two ration-
ales supporting the challenge:
1. As everyone must be sensible, what sudden impressions
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the
bare looks and gestures of another; and how necessary it is,
that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a
good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally
disconcert him; the law wills not that he should be tried by
any man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even
without being able to assign a reason for such his dislike. 2.
Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason as-
signed prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the
bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a
resentment; to prevent all ill consequences from which, the
prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set
him aside.2
Although the Framers did not expressly incorporate the peremp-
tory challenge into the sixth amendment,28 the Supreme Court
24. In a federal criminal trial, the prosecution and the defense have a variable number
of peremptory challenges, depending upon the gravity of the charge. In trials for capital
offenses, for example, each side may exercise 20 peremptory challenges. FED. R. CRIi.
P. 24(b). If the alleged offense is punishable by confinement not exceeding one year, each
side may use only three peremptory challenges. Id.
25. M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 55 (1978); see Babcock, Voir
Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderfid Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554 (1975) ("[W]e have
evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expression of what
we dare not say but know is truemore often than not.").
26. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at 353.
27. Id. Contrary to the contemporary perception that the practice was a bastion of
common law jury trials, Blackstone's work discloses that the challenge was limited to
capital trials and was not employed unquestionably by the Crown: "[T]he king shall
challenge no jurors without assigning a cause certain, to be tried and approved by the
court." Id. Furthermore, the frequently low number of available venirepersons prevented
use of the peremptory challenge without resulting in an inadequate number of jurors;
consequently, neither side could regularly employ them. See J. CocKBuRN & T. GREEN,
TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE 71 (1988).
28. Patrick Henry criticized the Framers for failing to express in the sixth amendment
the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges:
If [the people] dare oppose the hands of tyrannical power, you will see what
has happened elsewhere. They may be tried by the most partial powers, by
their most implacable enemies, and be sentenced and put to death, with all
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traditionally has given the practice a lofty position. In the late
1800's, the Court expressed seemingly unwavering faith in the
peremptory challenge:
Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to
free the jury-box from men unfit to be there is the exercise
of the peremptory challenge. The public prosecutor may have
the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror
offered, from his habits and associations, and yet find it difficult
to formulate and sustain a legal objection to him.2
More recently, the Court suggested that peremptories engender
a fair trial: "The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate
extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties
that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the
basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise."''
Although the Court's lofty rhetoric appears to have made the
peremptory challenge sacrosanct as the means of assuring a fair
trial 31 a critical analysis asks how fairness stems from a strike
that is not necessarily an instrument of neutrality, but instead a
weapon to adjust the outcome of a case. Limited only in number,
the peremptory challenge perpetuates invidious stereotypes, as
each party applies both limited knowledge of the jurors and
generalizations shaped by experience to eliminate jurors seem-
ingly unsympathetic to a litigant.3 2 Depending upon the compo-
the forms of a fair trial. . . .I would rather the trial by jury were struck
out altogether.
V. HANS & N. WIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 37 (1986) (quoting Patrick Henry, Virginia
Ratification Debates). James Madison, on the other hand, interpreted the amendment
more broadly: "Where a technical word r"impartial"] was used .... all the incidents
belonging to it necessarily attended it. The right to challenge is incident to the trial by
jury, and, therefore, as one is secured, so is the other." Id. (quoting James Madison,
Virginia Ratification Debates).
29. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887); see also Pointer v. United States, 151
U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("The right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing
cause is one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused. . . .Any system
for the empaneling of a jury that pre[v]ents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise
by the accused of that right, must be condemned.").
30. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
31. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 808 (1990) (plausible that sixth amendment
requirement of an "'impartial jury' impliedly compels peremptory challenges"); Pointer,
151 U.S. at 408 (peremptory challenge "is one of the most important of the rights secured
to the accused"). But see Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (declaring that
the Constitution mandates peremptory challenges for neither the government nor the
accused).
32. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 152-60 (1977). According to Van Dyke, prosecutors typically
look for those prospective jurors who, presumably, will be partial to government-those
1032 [Vol. 32:1027
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sition of the venire and the number of peremptory strikes allowed,
the parties may summarily strike whole groups from participation
in a trial; not only may the group and the community conse-
quently doubt the integrity of the process, but the process has
possibly eliminated a realm of human experience composing the
voice of the community.s
In an effort to assemble a group of people whose diverse
backgrounds may promote vigorous deliberation, the court ac-
quiesces in each side's effort to stack the jury in its favor.
Recognizing that parties may wield peremptory challenges to
assemble bias rather than to remove partiality,m the Court has
employed two amendments to curb unjustified challenges based
upon ill-founded notions of group bias: the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause35 and the fair cross section require-
ment implicit in the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.6
In 1990, the Court held in Holland v. Illinois37 that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments each offer distinct protection to the par-
ties and to the judicial system in general. A five-to-four majority
held that the sixth amendment mandates an impartial jury-not
who are white, middle-aged, and middle class. Id. at 152. Defense attorneys, on the other
hand, look for venirepersons whose occupations require self-governance: for example,
salespeople, actors, and writers probably "have been exposed to a wide variety of
experiences, are not easily shocked by crime, and are likelier to forgive indiscretions in
others." V. HANS & N. WAMR, supra note 28, at 73. But see Zeisel & Diamond, The
Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District
Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978). Zeisel and Diamond studied the decisionmaking of
three groups of jurors: peremptorily struck jurors, randomly selected jurors from the
remainder of the venire, and jurors chosen through voir dire. Id. at 492, 498. Analysis of
the verdicts of these three groups, which heard the same testimony and saw the same
exhibits in 12 cases, rebuts the presumption that peremptory challenges have some
influence on the verdict, as prosecutors generally failed to alter verdicts through per-
emptory challenges and defense counsel were "only slightly better" than their counter-
parts. I. at 492, 528.
33. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (footnote omitted) (Marshall, J.):
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from
jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human
nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown
and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded
group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that
its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may
have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.
34. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) ("The reality of practice, amply
reflected in many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and
unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate . . ").
35. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 59 U.S.L.W. 4268 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1991) (No. 89-5011); Batson,
476 U.S. 79; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
36. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
37. 110 S. Ct. 803.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1027
a representative one-and that a party may not invoke the sixth
amendment to contest the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges.38 By straying from its previous path of demanding
nondiscriminatory jury selection, the Court halted its progress
toward an end to racial discrimination in jury selection.3 9
STRIKING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
A Challenge on Equal Protection Grounds
Although the Supreme Court has refused to eliminate peremp-
tory challenges, it has begun to insist that the practice have a
legitimate basis. The Court's prohibition of challenges based
purely on jurors' race in Batson v. Kentucky40 marked the first
noticeable inroad on peremptory challenges. The Court traveled
a circuitous route, however, to reach that exception.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,41 decided in the post-Reconstruc-
tion era, the Court held that a state law allowing only white
males to serve on juries denied a black defendant equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. 42 During the civil rights move-
ment almost a century later, however, the Court erected an
imposing barrier for a defendant to hurdle when asserting an
equal protection violation. In Swain v. Alabama, 44 the Court
held that the objector must uncover purposeful discrimination by
showing that the prosecutor in the case at hand had, over a
period of time, excluded blacks on the basis of race.45 In this
38. Id. at 806. Petitioner Daniel Holland, who was white, employed the sixth amendment
to challenge the prosecution's peremptory removal of the only two blacks in the venire.
Id. at 805.
39. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding that the fourteenth amendment prevents
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution to remove venire-
persons of the defendant's own race); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (declaring that an integral
component of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury is the right to have a jury
drawn from a fair cross section of the community).
40. 476 U.S. 79.
41. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
42. Id. at 310. The Court further declared,
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied...
all right to participate . . . as jurors, because of their color, though they are
citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand
upon them,. . . an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id. at 308.
43. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 226-27. The Court noted that peremptory challenges are a "suitable and
1034
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instance, the Court found that despite the total exclusion of
blacks from the juries empaneled in that jurisdiction since 1950,48
the defense failed to show that the particular prosecutor in
Swain's trial historically had exercised his challenges discrimi-
natorily.47 Not until a century after Strauder did the Court take
a significant step toward limiting discriminatory strikes against
black venirepersons.48
In Batson, the Court lowered the threshold of proof required
in Swain, thereby restraining the "unfettered exercise"4 9 of per-
emptory challenges. Petitioner James Batson contested the pro-
secutor's peremptory removal of all four black venirepersons,
which left an all-white jury.5° The jury convicted Batson, and on
necessary method of securing juries which in fact.. . are fair and impartial." Id. at 212.
Moreover, the Court declared that a prosecutor may strike potential jurors on the basis
of group affiliations, "whether they be Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those with blue
eyes." Id.
46. Id. at 205. Although black males over age 21 constituted 26% of the males in
Talladega County, Alabama, eligible to participate, they were usually underrepresented
on jury venires; no black had survived voir dire challenges since 1950. Id. In petitioner
Robert Swain's case, of the eight blacks in the venire, two were exempt from jury
service, and the prosecutor peremptorily struck the remaining six. Id.
At the time of Swain's trial, the State of Alabama used a "key-man" system to compile
juror source lists: jury commissioners from each county placed on the juror roll the
names of all qualified males, including those "reputed to be honest and intelligent men
... esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment."
Id. at 206 n.2 (quoting ALA. CODE tit. 30, S 21 (1958)).
47. Id. at 227. The Court further held that the prosecution is presumed to have struck
prospective jurors impartially. Id. at 222. Before Batson's relaxation of Swain, only two
cases had satisfied the Swain requirement. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La.
1979); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
In his dissent in Swain, Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas, rebuked the majority for placing the "inviolabile]' peremptory challenge over
the defendant's right to an impartial jury. Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
48. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
49. Id. at 98. The cases presented thus far stemmed from peremptory challenges
employed before criminal jury trials. At least one court has held recently that the equal
protection clause also applies to peremptory challenges in a private civil action. See Fludd
v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 829 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989). In Fludd, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial judge becomes
a state actor when he overrules an objection to a discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges:
In overruling the objection, ... the judge becomes guilty of the sort of
discriminatory conduct that the equal protection clause proscribes. Because
the trial judge constitutes the discriminatory state actor under the equal
protection clause, we conclude that there is no constitutional bar to the
application of Batson to a civil suit.
Id. at 828. For a contrary view, see infra note 60.
50. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
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appeal the Kentucky Supreme Court, relying on Swain, refused
to adopt the position that "preemptory [sic] challenges against
minority groups can be unconstitutional if they were shown to
be a pattern of challenges against jurors from a discrete group
and a likelihood [existed] that the challenges were based solely
on group membership." 51
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Batson con-
tested his conviction primarily on sixth amendment grounds,
5 2
but Justice Powell, writing for the majority, based the Court's
decision on the equal protection clause. According to the Court's
earlier ruling in Swain, a contestant must base an equal protec-
tion argument upon a showing of purposeful discrimination by
the prosecutor over a period of time. . In Batson, however, the
majority ruled that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely
on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial.."5 5 The Court announced a
three-part test: the defendant must show that those removed
constitute a "cognizable racial group";5 that the defendant is a
member of that racial group;5 7 and that the surrounding facts,
either of systematic exclusion or of the particular case, raise an
51. Batson v. Commonwealth, No. 84-SC-733-MR, mem. op. at 8 (Ky. Dec. 20, 1984)
(citations omitted), in Joint Appendix, On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky (U.S. June 17, 1985) (No. 84-6263).
52. Brief for Petition of Certiorari at 4, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No.
84-263).
This brief is premised on the belief that the concept of the jury as a fair
cross-section of the community announced in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975), was designed to secure a trial jury that is representative of the
community and not simply to create a representative panel or venire from
which a prosecutor can exclude groups of people by means of peremptory
challenges.
Id.
53. The majority wrote, "We agree with the State that resolution of petitioner's claim
properly turns on application of equal protection principles and express no view on the
merits of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments." Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4.
Whether the petitioner asserted both grounds for reversal was a source of contention
between the majority and the dissent. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that the petitioner had relied on the sixth amendment and conceded
that he was not making an equal protection claim under the fourteenth amendment:
"Petitioner's 'question presented' involved only the 'constitutional provisions guaranteeing
the defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of persons representing a fair cross
section of the community.'" Id. at 113 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Petition
of Certiorari at i).
54. 380 U.S. 202, 226-27 (1965).
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inference that the exclusions were based solely upon race.s Once
the defendant has developed a prima facie case of purposeful
prosecutorial discrimination, the prosecution "must articulate a
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried."5 9
Batson stepped significantly beyond Swain toward the goals of
eradicating race-based discrimination and of fostering community
representation in a black defendant's jury trial, but the decision
spawned more questions than it resolved.60 For example, until
58. Id. Temporarily overlooking the heavy burden in Swain, Powell added,
[Tihe Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of black citizens
on a particular jury array where the selection mechanism is subject to
abuse .... For evidentiary requirements to dictate that "several must suffer
discrimination" before one could object would be inconsistent with the
promise of equal protection to all.
Id. at 95-96 (citation omitted). The Court did not, however, define when a logical inference
should be drawn that a party exercised peremptory challenges discriminatorily; it merely
stated that "the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances:' Id. On one hand,
the Court's vagueness will prompt much litigation over the sufficiency of evidence of
discrimination. On the other hand, talismanic formulas to calculate discrimination would
leave more troublesome results. Without considering the composition of the community
and the representativeness of the venire, the Court would provide parameters of legiti-
mate discrimination within which each party could operate.
For illustrations of courts applying differing litmus tests to detect discrimination,
thereby reaching dissimilar results, see Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CnM. L. &
CRIMIOLOGY 1, 27-37 (1988).
59. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. Furthermore, "the prosecutor must give a 'clear and
reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges,"
id at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258
(1981)), which means more than a good faith explanation. Id. at 98.
After announcing this new test, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to
decide whether "the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and [if so,
whether] the prosecutor [can] come forward with a neutral explanation for his action:'
Id. at 100.
60. As this Note was going to print, the Supreme Court was considering two issues
that could further diminish discrimination in the selection process while fostering broader
participation within the community: Batson's applicability to civil trials, Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990),
and circumstances yielding a prima facie case of prosecutorial discrimination, Hernandez
v. New York, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 621, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1990), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 242 (1990).
In Edmonson, petitioner Thaddeus Edmonson, who had brought a personal injury
action, asserted that Batson should apply to jury selection in civil trials. 895 F.2d at 219.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a civil litigant is not
a state actor and, therefore, that peremptory challenges are not subject to scrutiny in
civil cases. Id. at 221-22. The court in Edmonson failed to resolve whether its holding
would apply when the State is a civil litigant. Id. at 222 n.10. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that, regardless of the civil or criminal nature
of the case, a government litigant cannot exercise racially discriminatory strikes. Reynolds
v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59
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the Court's decision last Term in Powers v. Ohio,61 the viability
U.S.L.W. 3053 (U.S. June 25, 1990) (No. 90-1).
Resolution of the issue in Edmonson may dispose of another issue-whether Batson
applies equally to the defense in criminal cases when the sixth amendment, without
mentioning the right of the prosecution, expressly provides that the accused has a right
to an impartial jury. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Should that issue arise, the Court may
attempt to distinguish purportedly different interests at stake in criminal and civil trials.
Whereas in a civil case the jury serves primarily as a factfinder, in the criminal context,
a jury of laypersons also lends integrity to and legitimates the criminal justice process,
giving the defendant the confidence that he is not being adjudged by collusive prosecutors
and compliant judges. On the other hand, in isolated instances members of the Court
have stated that the prosecution likewise is entitled to a fair trial. See, e.g., Batson, 476
U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887))
("'Between [the accused] and the state the scales are to be evenly held.' "); Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 535 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he people as a whole ...
have as much right to an impartial jury as do criminal defendants."); Fay v. New York,
332 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1947) ("Society also has a right to a fair trial. The defendant's right
is a neutral jury. He has no constitutional right to friends on the jury."). But cf. Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that a public defender in a criminal
case does not engage in state action when representing a client in court).
In Hernandez, also argued last Term, the Court, in granting certiorari, limited the
appeal to the following two issues: (1) whether the prosecutor had offered a race-neutral
explanation when he asserted that he had struck two Latino jurors because both stated
on voir dire that they would hesitate to abide by the official, English translation of
testimony given in Spanish, which they would already comprehend; (2) the degree of
deference an appellate court owes to a trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor has
offered a race-neutral explanation. 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990).
Furthermore, this Note does not comprehensively address what constitutes a prima
facie case under Batson, an issue dividing lower courts. See Serr & Maney, supra note
58. In Batson the Court held, "For evidentiary requirements to dictate that 'several must
suffer discrimination' before one could object . . . would be inconsistent with the promise
of equal protection to all." Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461
U.S. 961, 965 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). This statement
may refer to the Court's limitation of Swain, which required a showing that the prose-
cution discriminatorily struck jurors over a period of time-not only in one case. In
Batson, the Court stated that the defense must reveal a "pattern" of strikes against
jurors of the same race, id. at 96-97, which may mean more than one instance of
discrimination.
On the other hand, the Court could have meant that race-based discrimination against
any person is prohibited. Several courts have held that "'the striking of a single black
juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black
jurors are seated.'" United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting
United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 304
(1990); see United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1545-46 (l1th Cir. 1989) (peremptory
strike of only black in venire may establish prima facie case); Stanley v. State, 313 Md.
50, 84-87, 542 A.2d 1267, 1283-85 (1988) (if the state uses peremptories to strike all blacks,
even when only one is empaneled, the court may find a prima facie case).
The Supreme Court, however, could have meant that the result, and not the means,
demonstrates whether the prosecution has transgressed. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81, 86 (1988) ("Any claim that the jury was not impartial ...must focus not on [a
potential juror who was excluded], but on the jurors who ultimately sat."); United States
v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143, 147-49 (4th Cir. 1989) (although prosecutor peremptorily struck
six black venirepersons when using nine peremptories, defendant failed to make a prima
1038
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of cross-racial challenges to discriminatory peremptories had not
been resolved. Given the historical suspectedness of the struck
group 62 and the fundamentality of the right to trial by an impar-
tial jury, the Court's decision in Batson also left room for spec-
ulation over the application of its reasoning to other cognizable
groups.6 Most significantly, however, by relying on the four-
teenth amendment, the Court left obscure its perception of the
sixth amendment's role in the selection of the petit jury, an issue
it resolved abruptly in Holland v. Illinois."
Peremptorily Challenging a Representative Cross Section
Nowhere does the sixth amendment state expressly that an
"impartial jury" is one drawn from a fair cross section of the
community, but the Supreme Court traditionally has linked the
sixth amendment to a jury ideally embodying a microcosm of the
community.65 Before limiting the import of the sixth amendment
to the means of assembling a representative venire," the Court
suggested that the amendment applies to selection of the petit
jury.6 7
In Taylor v. Louisiana,68 the defendant, a male, challenged the
constitutionality of women's underrepresentation in jury pools;
facie showing when two blacks remained on petit jury and three of six alternates were
black), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2178 (1990); United States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487
(4th Cir. 1987) (despite prosecutor's peremptory removal of four blacks, number of blacks
remaining on jury represented their percentage in the district's population, thus preclud-
ing a Batson violation); Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 94, 733 S.W.2d 728, 731 (1987) ("The
best answer the state can have to a charge of discrimination is to be able to point to a
jury which has some black members."). These holdings suggest that the prosecution, with
impunity, may take several bites of the forbidden fruit. But see Alvarado v. United States,
110 S. Ct. 2995, 2996 (1990) (per curiam) (without ruling on the merits, a five-to-four
majority vacated a Second Circuit ruling, regarding which the prosecution conceded error,
that would have allowed racially discriminatory strikes as long as the petit jury satisfied
the fair cross section concept).
61. 59 U.S.L.W. 4268 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1991) (No. 89-5011).
62. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (racial classifications bear
"a heavy burden of justification").
63. For a discussion of the characteristics of cognizability, see Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d
1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989) ("similarity of attitudes
binding all members of the group, which are] not shared by the remainder of the
community," marks cognizable group) (citations omitted).
64. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09, 144-46.
66. See Holland., 110 S. Ct. at 809.
67. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (sixth amendment applies to selection of
venire); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (sixth amendment applies to jury pool).
68. 419 U.S. 522.
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women were exempt unless they volunteered for jury duty. 9 The
Court held that a male defendant had standing to challenge such
systematic exclusion.7" Moreover, the Court stated that the sixth
amendment guarantees "a fair possibility for obtaining a jury
constituting a representative cross section of the community,"
71
but does not require that the jury "mirror the community and
reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. ' 72 In
Duren v. Missouri,73 the Court held that a system allowing women
to opt out of jury duty, the converse of the situation in Taylor,
likewise led to impermissible underrepresentation violative of the
sixth amendment. 4 Nevertheless, prior to Holland v. Illinois, the
Court avoided an extension of Taylor's reasoning by misconstru-
ing a reasonable inference of that case.75
In Teague v. Lane,76 the prosecution used its allotted peremp-
tory challenges to remove only black venirepersons, leaving a
white jury to try Frank Teague, a black defendant. 7 The trial
judge denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, reasoning
that the jury "'appear[ed] to be a fair [one],'" and the jury
convicted Teague.78 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit rejected Teague's assertion that the sixth amend-
ment mandates at least the possibility that the petit jury will
comprise a fair cross section of the community.79 On appeal to
the Supreme Court, Teague stated that he was entitled to "pro-
cedures that allow a fair possibility for the jury to reflect a cross
69. Id. at 524-25.
70. Id. at 526.
71. Id. at 528 (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (Marshall, J.)) (emphasis
added).
72. Id. at 538.
73. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
74. Id. at 369. In Duren, the Court announced a three-part test to apply when deciding
whether the sixth amendment's fair cross section requirement has been satisfied:
[Tihe defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
"distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that
this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury selection process.
Id. at 364.
75. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 292-93.
78. Id. at 293.




section of the community." A plurality of the Court, however,
held that even if the fair cross section requirement applied to
selection of the petit jury, it would not apply to a case on
collateral review by way of a habeas petition.81 Moreover, in its
discussion of Teague's claim, the Court reconfigured his argument
in the exact terms the Court rejected in Taylor-that the petit
jury's composition must mirror the distinct groups within the
community.P
In his dissent, Justice Brennan accused the plurality of
"mischaracterizing" Teague's sixth amendment claim and found
that an extension of Taylor's sixth amendment reasoning would
differ little from the result reached in Batson:
The only potentially significant difference is that Teague's
claim, if valid, would bar the prosecution from excluding ven-
irepersons from the petit jury on account of their membership
in some cognizable group even when the defendant is not
himself a member of that group, whereas the Equal Protection
Clause might not provide a basis for relief unless the defendant
belonged to the group whose members were improperly ex-
cluded.8
Nevertheless, in Holland, a divided Court addressed the reach
of the sixth amendment and rejected foursquare the argument
that a trial judge must preserve the possibility of a representa-
tive petit jury:
[T]o say that the Sixth Amendment deprives the State of the
ability to "stack the deck" in its favor is not to say that each
side may not, once a fair hand is dealt, use peremptory chal-
lenges to eliminate prospective jurors belonging to groups it
believes would unduly favor the other side.85
80. Teague, 489 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 4).
Teague, who was black, pleaded the sixth amendment because the Court had held in
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam), that Batson did not apply to cases on
collateral review.
81. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-10 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
82. Id. at 299 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Although Teague compared the percent-
age of blacks on the petit jury with their percentage in the community only as an
indication of disproportionate exclusion, Justice O'Connor asserted that Teague demanded
proportionate representation. Id. at 301 n.1.
83. Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id at 341.42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807 (1990).
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Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Scalia addressed two
issues on appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court: (1) whether a
white defendant has standing to challenge the prosecutor's ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges to exclude all black venirepersons
and (2) whether those exclusions deprive the defendant of the
impartial jury guaranteed by the sixth amendment.8 Although
all Justices held that a white defendant does have standing under
the sixth amendment to challenge the peremptory removal of
blacks, they disagreed on whether petitioner Holland could ex-
tend the cross section requirement to the petit jury.87
Just as Frank Teague had asserted, petitioner Daniel Holland
claimed that the removal of all blacks "violated the Sixth Amend-
ment by denying him a 'fair possibility' of a petit jury repre-
senting a cross section of the community."'' On this occasion,
however, the Court neither skirted nor misconstrued the issue;89
it cursorily rejected the petitioner's construction of the sixth
amendment:
We reject petitioner's fundamental thesis that a prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to eliminate a distinctive group
in the community deprives the defendant of a Sixth Amend-
ment right to the "fair possibility" of a representative jury....
A prohibition upon the exclusion of cognizable groups through
peremptory challenges has no conceivable basis in the text of
the Sixth Amendment, is without support in our prior deci-
sions, and would undermine rather than further the constitu-
tional guarantee of an impartial jury.9
Furthermore, "[the defendant] does not have a valid constitutional
challenge based on the Sixth Amendment-which no more forbids
the prosecutor to strike jurors on the basis of race than it forbids
him to strike them on the basis of innumerable other generalized
characteristics."91 Additionally, Justice Scalia declared that the
fair cross section requirement "has never included the notion
86. Id. at 805.
87. Id.; id. at 811 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 806.
89. Although the majority in Holland finally did confront the issue presented in Teague,
as an afterthought it reverted to its misapplication of Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975). Justice Scalia wrote that Taylor "specifically disclaimed application of [its] analysis
to the petit jury." Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 810.
90. Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 806.
91. Id. at 811.
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that, in the process of drawing the jury, that initial representa-
tiveness cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused and
the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against
their interests. '92
By limiting the reach of the sixth amendment in Holland, the
Court intimated that, as contrasted with a Batson-type racial
correlation between the accused and the struck venirepersons, a
defendant invoking the sixth amendment lacks a viable complaint
if the prosecution arbitrarily removes members of another race.
The impermissible presumption that black members of the venire
are partial to blacks, a presumption violating the equal protection
clause,93 "has nothing to do with the legal issue in th[e] case."94
The lesson from Holland, however, is not the limited reach of
the sixth amendment; rather, the subtle message is that the
reprehensibility of discriminatory tactics apparently diminishes
when the races of the defendant and the venirepersons differ.
The immediate impact of this reasoning is the same in each
case: the jury lacks the participation of a sizable group in the
community, and the judiciary denies the defendant the possibility
of a representative jury. The remaining impression is more subtle
but no less objectionable: race does make a difference in the
courtroom. Such line drawing suggests further that a defendant's
confidence in his jury's impartiality rests in the appearance of
impartiality as seen through the defendant's subjective lens.
Ironically, in an effort to remove racial considerations from the
courtroom, the Court encouraged the mentality that racial groups
should limit their expectations of impartiality and fairness to
members of their own respective race. The Court's decision in
Powers v. Ohio,95 however, indicates that seven Justices may have
seen the handwriting on the wall.9 If they had held that a white
defendant may not challenge, on equal protection grounds, the
92. Id. at 807.
93. Id. at 828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87
(1986)).
94. Id. at 810. "All we hold is that he does not have a valid constitutional challenge
based on the Sixth Amendment." Id.
95. 59 U.S.L.W. 4268 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1991) (No. 89-5011).
96. Although in Holland petitioner Daniel Holland, who was white, relied on the sixth
amendment to challenge the prosecution's peremptory removal of black venirepersons,
five Justices declared that petitioner Holland had standing under the equal protection
clause. See Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 812 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 813 (Marshall, J.,
with whom Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, dissenting); id. at 821-22 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Of those five, Justice William Brennan has since retired. His replacement,
Justice David Souter, and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who did not comment on the
viability of an equal protection claim discussed by several. Justices in Holland, composed
part of the seven-Justice majority in Powers.
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peremptory removal of black venirepersons, then they might as
well have stated what Batson and Holland only intimated: inex-
plicably, a fair trial may depend on the racial composition of the
jury.97
COMING TO TERMS WITH EQUAL PROTECTION, IMPARTIALITY, AND
REPRESENTATIVENESS
The Court in Batson and Powers stated that the accused is
harmed when the prosecution discriminatorily strikes jurors based
on their race, but the exact harm remains elusive. In Batson, the
majority declared that a black defendant has a "right to be tried
by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscrimi-
natory criteria"9 8 and that racial discrimination prevents trial by
a jury of a defendant's equals. 99 In Powers, the majority held that
race-based challenges cause a defendant a "cognizable"' 10  or
"real"'01 injury, because such discrimination "'casts doubt on the
integrity of the judicial process.' "1102 Nevertheless, in neither case
did the Court state that a criminal trial is fairer when a jury
comprises several races. To the contrary, the majority in Powers
conceded that if a group's sympathy toward the accused were
the sole reason he challenged its removal, then those jurors could
be removed for cause anyway. 103 Given the Court's failure to
define any concrete injury the defendant suffers when discrimi-
nation takes place, it should not be surprising that in Powers, in
which the harm appeared less invidious because the defendant's
race was not the object of discrimination, the Court focused on
those actually harmed-the excluded jurors.0 4
97. Although Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, dissenting, did
not expressly assert that a defendant has less room to complain when members of his
own race try him, he did encourage that conclusion:
[I]t is entirely offensive for the State to imprison a person on the basis of a
conviction rendered by a jury from which members of that person's minority
race were carefully excluded. I am unmoved, however, and I think most
Americans would be, by this white defendant's complaint that he was sought
to be tried by an all-white jury ....
Powers, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4276 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316
(1906)).
99. Id. at 86.
100. Powers, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4271.
101. Id, at 4272.
102. Id. at 4271 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
103. Id
104. See id. at 4270-73. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted, "A veni-
reperson excluded from jury service because of race suffers a profound personal humili-
ation heightened by its public character." Id. at 4272.
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An examination of the sixth amendment cases likewise reveals
that the Justices' concern is not purported harm to the defendant
but is, instead, public disrespect and doubt bred by the removal
of citizens competent to serve impartially. In Holland, for ex-
ample, the underlying issue was not the reach of the sixth
amendment but the meaning of a trial by an "impartial jury."
The majority and dissenting opinions reflect Justices wrestling
with a definition that promotes inclusion of a broad range of
perspectives but that does not imply that impartiality mandates
a heterogeneous jury. Writing for the majority in Holland, Justice
Scalia noted that the fair cross section requirement stems from
the "traditional understanding of how an 'impartial jury' is as-
sembled,"'" 5 but he drew a line at the venire, stating that the
Court has never construed the sixth amendment to require a
representative jury-only an impartial one.1' 6 Although he never
expressly stated that a heterogeneous jury will not lead to
greater impartiality, Scalia's preservation of the peremptory chal-
lenge, when confronted with the sixth amendment, suggests that
he views impartiality as an individual characteristic not linked
to a counterbalancing of perspectives. 10 7
105. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
106. Id. Justice Kennedy concurred, asserting that expansion of the scope of the sixth
amendment to selection of the petit jury would have "no limiting principle to make it
workable in practice." Id. at 811 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Nevertheless, he emphasized
that under the equal protection clause, Holland could have asserted both his right to a
jury chosen according to "nondiscriminatory criteria" and the rights of jurors removed
because of their race. Id. at 812. Focusing predominantly upon a defendant's advantageous
position to protect "the duty[ ] and honor[ ] of jury service," Kennedy suggested that the
opportunity to participate-rather than the purported injury to a defendant tried before
a less heterogeneous jury-motivated his argument. Id.
107. Scalia's belief that the removal of "postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen," id. at 810,
would implicate the sixth amendment no less than the removal of blacks-but nonetheless
not compromise the impartiality of the resulting jury-also suggests that he perceives
impartiality as an individual attribute not influenced by the experiential baggage each
juror brings into the courtroom.
Such reasoning resembles two dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist. In Taylor
he ridiculed the majority's reasoning that including women on a jury adds a "flavor"
otherwise absent when only men deliberate. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 541-
42 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He continued, "[Tlhis 'flavor' is not of such importance
that the Constitution is offended if any given petit jury is not so enriched." Id. at 542
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist also rejected the belief that underrepresentativeness
injures the defendant:
[The majority] concludes that the jury is not effective, as a prophylaxis
against arbitrary prosecutorial and judicial power, if the "jury pool is made
up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups
are excluded from the pool." It fails, however, to provide any satisfactory
explanation of the mechanism by which the Louisiana system undermines
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In separate dissents, Justices Marshall and Stevens approached
differently the meaning of "impartiality." Marshall asserted that
the sixth amendment demands not only an impartial jury, but
also one drawn from a cross section of the community. 10 He
added, however, that the exclusion of distinct groups denies a
defendant "the benefit of the common-sense judgment of the
community."'10 9 Nonetheless, except for mentioning that the de-
fendant's right "arguably . . . would be [better] served by a
requirement that all distinctive groups in the community be
represented on each petit jury,""' 0 Marshall never linked racial
representativeness with impartiality. Instead, as Justice Kennedy
did in his concurrence,"' Marshall concentrated on the need to
eradicate racially discriminatory challenges of qualified jurors." 2
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, asserted unequivocally that
racially discriminatory selection contravenes the principle of an
impartial jury" s by denying a defendant his "interest in a neutral
factfinder.""14 Stevens acknowledged, however, that preoccupa-
tion with race alone would lead to a disregard of other groups."5
Like Marshall, Stevens apparently was more concerned about the
the prophylactic role of the jury ....
Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at 530).
Similarly, in his dissent in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), Rehnquist pointed
out that if the sexes truly do produce a more impartial jury, "a defendant would be
entitled to a jury composed of men and women in perfect proportion to their numbers
in the community." Id. at 372 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On the other hand, "[i]f. . . men
and women are essentially fungible for purposes of jury duty, the question arises how
underrepresentation of either sex on the jury or the venire infringes on a defendant's
right to have his fate decided by an impartial tribunal." Id. Rehnquist contended that
the compelling issue should not be the defendant's right to have a fair cross section of
the community deliberate his case but rather the equal protection interest of the
prospective juror. Id. at 373 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist did not apply the same reasoning, however, in Batson instead, he stated
that no equal protection violation occurs so long as the State consistently uses peremptory
challenges against venirepersons of a defendant's race, regardless of his race. See Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Such a practice would reduce
equal protection to equal infringement.
108. Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 815 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986)).
110. Id. at 817 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. See supra note 106.
112. Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 817-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 820-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 827 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259
(1986)).
115. Id. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]hile a racially balanced jury would be
representative of the racial groups in the community, the focus on race would distort
the jury's reflection of other groups in society, characterized by age, sex, ethnicity,
religion, education level or economic class.").
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discriminatory use of peremptory challenges than about the com-
position of the final jury.
The Holland decision reveals the Court's struggle to avoid
capture by its own rhetoric. On one hand, the Court intimated
that individually impartial jurors, regardless of group affiliation,
comport with the notion of an impartial jury; on the other hand,
the Court emphasized that community participation, which inte-
grates a variety of backgrounds and attitudes, fosters an impar-
tial jury. By adhering to the former proposition, the Court suggests
that an underrepresentative jury has no injurious effect on the
accused, presumably because each individual is impartial. 16 When
the Court espouses the latter proposition,117 however, it states
euphemistically that no individual juror is impartial;1 8 instead,
one must infer that impartiality arises from counterbalanced
biases.
A review of several cases predating Holland and Powers and
consideration of the goals underlying a trial by jury reveal that
the Justices' fundamental and overriding impetus has not been
to protect the defendant from idiosyncratic perspectives, but
rather to give all segments of the community the opportunity to
participate in the judicial process.
In Taylor v. Louisiana,"19 the Court announced three compo-
nents of the fair cross section requirement implicit in the sixth
amendment: (1) the common sense of the community shields a
defendant from an "overzealous or mistaken prosecutor"; 2 (2)
"[c]ommunity participation. . . is also critical to public confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system";12' and (3) the jury's
representativeness "assur[es] . . . diffused impartiality."' The
first two ingredients implicate universal participation, or inclu-
siveness, which recognizes the democratic nature of the judicial
process. The third component, representativeness, also sounds
116. Nevertheless, neither the defendant nor the community as a whole is likely to
respect a verdict rendered by a jury comprising an insular subset of the community. For
example, if a discriminatorily selected white jury convicted a black, neither the defendant
nor the community would likely respect the verdict as much as a similar verdict rendered
by a racially mixed jury. Although a black jury might have reached the same result,
discriminatory tactics alone would erode the integrity of the process.
117. See infra notes 122, 129, and 144-46 and accompanying text.
118. A jury comprising only white males, each of whom appears impartial on voir dire,
who remain after the peremptory removal of all minorities and women will appear to be
less impartial than a jury resembling a representative percentage of genders and races.
119. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
120. Id. at 530 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
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the democratic belief that all persons, regardless of background,
should shape the community's conscience; however, it also sug-
gests that a less representative jury, whatever it may entail, 12
lacks the collective impartiality inherent in a more variegated
body. The Court's struggle to accommodate individual competence
to serve, on one hand, and to ensure diverse community partic-
ipation, on the other, dramatizes the tension that has produced
strained results.124
The Court's cases on the size of criminal petit juries help to
define the Justices' image of impartiality. In Williams v. Flor-
ida,12 which affirmed the constitutionality of six-person criminal
juries, the Court held that the "essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his
accuser . .. the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,
and in the community participation and shared responsibility that
results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence."''
The Court stated that a six-man jury would not "significantly
diminish[ ]" a jury's diversity.'12 It held to the contrary, however,
with regard to five-man juries. In Ballew v. Georgia,as the Court
found that juries with less than six members are more susceptible
to "biased decisionmaking,'" 12 not only because smaller juries are
less likely to retain facts accurately,130 to reach verdicts uni-
formly,131 and to assure minority participation,'3 2 but also because
they reduce "the counterbalancing of various biases [that] is
critical to the accurate application of the common sense of the
community to the facts of any given case."' In neither Ballew
nor Williams did the Court find that underrepresentation prej-
udiced the defendant, but both holdings suggest that impartiality
stems from vigorous debate among various segments of the
community.
In more perplexing cases, the Court found no traceable injury
to the defendant, which arguably would be spawned by the
123. Groups linked by race or gender are immutable, but such factors as education,
religion, age, and economic status also may shape how the individual may react to any
set of facts presented in a courtroom.
124. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
125. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
126. Id at 100.
127. Id. at 102.
128. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
129. Id. at 239.
130. Id. at 232-34.
131. Id. at 234-35.
132. Id. at 236-37.
133. Id. at 234.
1048 [Vol. 32:1027
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
exclusion of a discrete segment of society, but still was compelled
to condemn discriminatory practices. In Thiel v. Southern Pacifte
Co.,' jury commissioners regularly excluded daily wage earners
because these workers historically had been excused from jury
duty after claiming financial hardship.1 l 5 Because it did "violence
to the democratic nature of the jury system,"'," the Court pro-
hibited the systematic exclusion of wage earners.a Nevertheless,
the Court made no finding that the petitioner had been denied
an impartial jury.
In Peters v. Kiff,1 three Justices opined that the exclusion of
blacks from grand and petit juries denied a white defendant due
process: 1'
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the
jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps un-
knowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded
group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as
we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on
human events that may have unsuspected importance in any
case that may be presented. 40
Although that opinion never expressly equated jury bias with
group exclusion, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, drew that
inference; he retorted that the petitioner had failed to show that
the exclusion of blacks prejudiced him.'4 '
In Taylor v. Louisiana,'4 a male defendant alleged that he was
denied the right to a fair trial under the sixth amendment because
women, as a group, were exempted from jury duty unless they
134. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
135. Id. at 222.
136. Id. at 223.
137. Id.
138. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
139. Id. at 504 (Marshall, J.).
140. Id. at 503-04 (Marshall, J.) (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94
(1946)).
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, concurred in the judgment but
relied on 18 U.S.C. S 243, which provides, "No citizen possessing all other qualifications
which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit
juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of involuntary servitude ... ."Id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (citing
18 U.S.C. S 243 (1982)).
141. Id. at 510-11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
142. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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volunteered to serve.143 For the first-and only-time, the Court
directly linked impartiality with representativeness: "As long as
there are significant departures from the cross-sectional goal,
biased juries are the result-biased in the sense that they reflect
a slanted view of the community they are supposed to repre-
sent."' 4 4 Holding that both sexes bring to the jury box a "distinct
quality [that] is lost if either sex is excluded,' '1 45 the Court
squarely held that the exclusion of women from venires removes
the "diffused impartiality"1 46 linked to a representative jury.
Nevertheless, the Court never stated that the all-male jury that
tried Taylor was partial to the prosecution. 47 The Court held in
effect, however, that a jury comprising less than a representative
cross section of the sexes is less likely to be impartial than a
jury composed of more proportionate representation.
By insisting that women, as a distinct group, offer a unique
quality unshared by men, the Court in Taylor assumed that (1)
a jury composed of one gender is less impartial than a jury
comprising both genders; (2) men and women, as isolated groups,
possess a perspective unique to and universal among their re-
spective members; and (3) those perspectives counterbalance bias
inherent within the other gender, thus forming a more impartial
jury. Ironically, by linking group identification with shared atti-
143. Id. at 524-25, 533.
144. Id. at 529 n.7 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS 1792, 1797).
145. Id. at 532 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)).
146. Id. at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)). In Ballard, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, made a similar
observation:
The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women
are the same as those which influence the action of men-personality,
background, economic status-and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that
women when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men
likewise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who
would claim that a jury was truly representative of the community if all
men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel? The
truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively
of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay
of influence one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the
courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference.
Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.
Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94.
147. See Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DuKE L.J. 1,
30 (asserting that the majority in Taylor distorted the issue of impartiality to give the
petitioner standing) (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); see also
supra note 107.
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tudes, the Court carelessly prescribed exactly what it tried to
proscribe: it substituted ill-founded notions of group bias for
individual ability to deliberate impartially.
If the inferences drawn from Taylor are sound, the concept of
impartiality might mandate the inclusion of those cognizable
groups on the petit jury, a process that assumes juror competence
is limited to the group to which one belongs.148 Although it has
insisted that "[j]uror competence is an individual rather than a
group or class matter,"'149 the Court's assertion that groups,
characterized by race or gender, bring to the jury box a "qualit[y]
of human nature,"''1  among other "imponderable[s],"'1' suggests
that a representative jury amounts to a more impartial jury.
Nonetheless, the Court steadfastly has refused to hold that a
defendant is entitled to a jury reflecting the diversity within his
community.15 2 To hold that the jury must be a microcosm of the
148. In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), the Court in dictum denounced exclusionary
and inclusionary tactics: "An accused is entitled to have charges against hun considered
by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because
of race." Id. at 287. Contra Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966) (en banc)
(purposeful inclusion of blacks on grand jury vemre appropriate when selection procedure
results in underrepresentation), cert. dented, 386 U.S. 975 (1967).
Under English common law, a jury de 'medietate linguae, or a jury of the half-tongue,
heard cases involving a foreign merchant, presumably for convenience of communication
and for protection of sojourning merchants in England; half of the jurors were not from
England, but they did not necessarily share the foreign litigant's nationality. F BUSCH,
1 LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 65 (1959). Although some courts in the United
States once sanctioned its use, see ud. 65 n.20, this type of jury is no longer recognized.
See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
Under the assumption that a black defendant is deprived of the right to a fair trial
when a white jury hears his case, at least one commentator recommended adoption of a
scheme analogous to the jury de medietate linguae, calling for the affirmative selection
of black jurors. See Potash, Mandatory Ineluswn of Raial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3
BLACK L.J. 80, 92-94 (1973). Another commentator urged the drawing of jury districts
according to racial boundaries, and in less monochromatic areas, according to proportional
representation of races. See Note, The Case for Black Jure, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970).
Significantly, these articles were written before Batson lowered the insurmountable hurdle
the Court erected in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See supra notes 43-59 and
accompanying text.
149. Thel, 328 U.S. at 220.
150. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (Marshall, J.).
151. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
152. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) ("[W]e impose no requirement
that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various
distinctive groups in the population:'); Thsel, 328 U.S. at 220 ("This does not mean
that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial,
political and geographical groups of the community "); of. Ristamo v. Ross, 424 U.S.
589, 596 n.8 (1976) ("In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional consid-
erations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court
of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of
religion:').
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community would lead to the conclusion that an individual, whose
only link to a group is identical gender or race, will bring to jury
deliberations exactly that image the litigants stereotypically per-
ceive. Moreover, such a holding would only perpetuate stereo-
types in the last place they should survive-a courtroom. If the
Court means no such thing, as is indicated by its refusal to
demand representative petit juries, then its true motivation
emerges: the opportunity for community participation is vital to
the concept of trial by jury.
BATSON'S PROGENY: BREEDING CASES OF OVERT DISCRIMINATION
Doubting the majority's confidence that its decision would not
create "serious administrative burdens,"'-' Justice White warned
in his concurrence in Batson that "[m]uch litigation will be re-
quired to spell out the contours of the Court's equal protection
holding today, and the significant effect it will have on the
conduct of criminal trials cannot be gainsaid."'u Only one year
after the ruling, William Pizzi wrote, "If one wanted to under-
stand how the American trial system for criminal cases came to
be the most expensive and time-consuming in the world, it would
be difficult to find a better starting point than Batson."15 5 By
cautiously condemning race-based motives in jury selection, the
Court preserved the fanciful sanctity of the peremptory chal-
lenge, leaving undisturbed other forms of impermissible discrim-
ination in the courtroom. Holland v. Illinois5 8 foreclosed a
defendant's use of the sixth amendment to attack race-based
peremptory challenges; a ruling to the contrary would have
preserved the possibility of trial before a cross section of the
community.' The following discussion reveals the avenues of
discrimination left open by Batson that Powers and Holland never
closed, as it prompts the recommendation that the peremptory
challenge should be abolished.
Use of the Peremptory Challenge on Nonracial Grounds
The majority in Batson avoided addressing the relationship
between the sixth amendment's fair cross section requirement
153. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
154. Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
155. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup.
CT. REV. 97, 155.
156. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
157. For a discussion of two cases argued this Term that may make inroads on
discriminatory selection procedures, see supra note 60.
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and the parties' removal from the venire groups not linked by
race.158 In Holland, the Court's pronouncement that the sixth
amendment does not apply to the petit jury 59 cut off the path
toward a more racially representative jury. By stressing in Batson
that proof of a prima facie case initially depends upon a corre-
lation between the defendant's race and the race of the venire-
persons the prosecution peremptorily removed 1 60 the Court
implicitly licensed discrimination on nonracial grounds. Gender-
based discrimination, for example, which the Supreme Court has
disallowed during selection of the venire'16 and permitted outside
the courtroom only when the government can demonstrate an
important governmental interest,16 2 apparently can survive a lit-
eral application of Batson 3 The Court should acknowledge, how-
158. Although the Court denounced the prosecution's removal of prospective jurors on
account of race as violative of the equal protection clause, Batson, 476 U.S. at 84, it
surreptitiously refused to address Batson's sixth amendment claim that the jury be drawn
from a cross section of the community. Id at 84 n.4.
159. Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 810-11.
160. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
161. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
162. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (invali-
dating the state university's policy of limiting enrollment to women); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating law permitting 18-year-old women to buy beer but
proscribing purchases by men unless they were at least 21); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (invalidating gender-based law denying dependency benefits to male
spouse of female Air Force officer).
163. Stereotypes about women historically have led to their participation on or exclusion
from juries, depending upon the side making the challenge:
Clarence Darrow offered the categorical advice to avoid women in all defense
cases. Others recommend choosing women for the defense if the principal
witness against one's client is female, under the assumption that women are
somewhat distrustful of other women. Another view hints that "women's
intuition" may assist an attorney who can't win a case on the facts alone.
Moreover, other lawyers have volunteered that old women wearing too much
makeup are usually unstable. Then, of course, the challenge to Darrow: the
common belief that women are more sympathetic than men to criminal
defendants.
V. HANS & N. WminaR, supra note 28, at 73 (footnotes omitted); see 1 F. LANE, LANE'S
GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE S 9.47 (3d ed. 1984):
Women are preferred [for the defendant in personal injury cases] especially
when the plaintiff is a woman. It is thought that married women with
children will not sympathize with the plaintiff's effort to recover for pain
and suffering. The most severe pain in their lives was probably during
childbirth, which they endured without complaint or monetary compensation.
See also M. BELLi, 3 MODERN TRIALs S 51.68 (2d ed. 1982):
If plaintiff is a woman and has those qualities which other women envy-
good looks, a handsome husband, wealth, social position-then women jurors
would be unwise. Woman's inhumanity to womankind is unequalled. They
are the severest judges of their own sex. Generally, then, for a woman
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ever, that race does not have a monopoly on cognizability and
should proscribe other forms of discrimination.
Having confronted the validity of gender-based challenges,
federal and state courts disagree on Batson's application to non-
racial forms of discrimination.164 In Hamilton v. United States,165
the government exercised seven of its eight peremptory chal-
lenges to strike blacks from the jury.166 The prosecution explained
that the final three strikes of black women provided a more
balanced gender composition, which would curb a predominantly
female jury's sympathy for a female defendant. 167 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit begrudgingly
condoned this gender-based form of discrimination, holding, "While
we do not applaud the striking of jurors for any reason relating
to group classifications, we find no authority to support an
extension of Batson to instances other than racial discrimina-
tion."e The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. De GroSS 69 reached the opposite result. In De
Gross, the court held that, in the absence of a neutral explanation,
the defendant's peremptory removal of the eighth of eight men
struck by the defense constituted impermissible discrimination.170
plaintiff or where the witnesses on plaintiff's side are largely female, male
jurors would be more acceptable.
However, if plaintiff has nothing that a woman juror would envy, and no
criticism may be directed at her; if she has the same problems of raising a
family, an errant husband or wayward child, then women jurors would
commiserate with her in their verdict. Women also make good jurors for
plaintiff in children's cases.
164. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text; see also State v. Morgan, 553 So.
2d 1012, 1018 (La. Ct. App. 1989), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 600 (La. 1990) (Batson does not
apply when prosecution used peremptory challenges solely to exclude males); State v.
Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) (same; moreover, unlike blacks, males as a group
have not been victims of systematic discrimination). Contra People v. Irizarry, -
A.D.2d - , , 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (Batson applies to gender-
based discrimination; exclusion of women solely because of gender denies equal protection
to the defendant and to the struck jurors).
165. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990).
166. Id. at 1039.
167. Id. at 1041.
168. Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). Relying strictly on Batson's plain language, the
majority held that "if the Supreme Court in Batson had desired, it could have abolished
the peremptory challenge or prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the basis of
race, gender, age or other group classification." Id.
169. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
170. Id. at 1425. The court held, "[B]ecause the evils of discriminatory peremptory
challenges result from the misuse of peremptory challenges, regardless of which party
exercises the challenges, the fifth amendment similarly limits a federal criminal defen-
dant's peremptory challenges." Id. at 1423. In the same opinion, the court also rejected
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Regardless of the disagreement among appellate courts, the
Supreme Court has recognized that immutable characteristics do
not compromise an individual's ability to serve as an impartial
juror.171 The sexes, for example, bring to the courtroom i-defined
characteristics that may expand the spectrum of community
perspectives. Likewise, individuals loosely linked by economic
status, religious affiliation, or educational background, to name a
few, may react similarly to any given set of facts. Nevertheless,
recognition that a group may bring to the jury box a perspective
differing from another group's viewpoint does not mean that
either group is necessarily partial, nor does such an acknowledg-
ment necessarily dictate how a group member will react to the
evidence at hand. If a trial judge allowed to participate only
those jurors lacking diverse experiences to shape their decision-
making, a seemingly homogeneous mind-set, neither party would
enjoy the right to the diversity stemming from a jury drawn
from a cross section of the community. To the contrary, identical
backgrounds and indistinguishable perspectives-all sought in the
name of impartiality-would foster a group whose only superi-
ority to judges would be its members' collective ability to rec-
ollect more facts adduced at trial. Only when the court pronounces
as its goal inclusiveness- and not representativeness- can the
judicial process earn the confidence of the community without
succumbing to stereotypical notions of group biases.172
the prosecutor's attempt to justify the removal of the only person in the venire who
shared the same racial background as the defendant on the ground that he wanted more
men on the jury. Id. at 1426.
Nevertheless, in Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1990), the
same court limited its application of Batson when it held that a corporation could not
claim a violation of its equal protection right under Batson because a corporation was
not a member of the removed class, blacks. Moreover, the court distinguished the
government's duty to protect the rights of excluded venirepersons from the purported
duty of the civil corporate defendant: "Unlike the U.S. government, a civil defendant has
no inherent duty to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process.... Id. at 1380.
171. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975); see also Brest, The Supreme Court
1975 Term: Forward. In Defense of the Antdiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1,
10 (1976) (citation omitted.
Generalizations based on immutable personal traits such as race or sex are
especially frustrating because we can do nothing to escape their opera-
tion . . . . [Tjhey are often premised on the supposed correlation between
the inherited characteristic and the undesirable voluntary behavior of those
who possess the characteristic . . . . Because the behavior is voluntary, and
hence the proper object of moral condemnation, individuals as to whom the
generalization is inaccurate may justifiably feel that the decisionmaker has
passed moral judgment on them.
172. In Hamilton County, Ohio, "where an individual cannot rent an X-rated video,
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FOSTERING REPRESENTATIVENESS THROUGH INCLUSIVENESS
Expanding the Pool of Participants
The possibility of participation by a cross section of the com-
munity begins not with hindsight, appellate review of purportedly
discriminatory tactics but with the first step toward bringing
jurors to the courthouse- selection of the venire. Necessarily, a
method attempting to encompass a spectrum of racial, cultural,
and socioeconomic backgrounds, among others, improves the pos-
sibility that a venire will resemble the diversity of the commu-
nity. Many states choose jurors from voter registration lists,173
where film societies and the resident professional theater company live in fear of police
censorship, and [where] Hustler magazine is not openly displayed in most stores,"
prosecutors brought suit against Cincinnati's Contemporary Art Center and its director
for allegedly displaying obscene photographs taken by Robert Mapplethorpe. Kaufman,
Both Sides Battled for Cincinnati's Souls, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 8, col. 1. The 172
photographs in the Mapplethorpe exhibit included depictions of a man's hand and forearm
inserted in the rectum of another man, a bullwhip protruding from Mapplethorpe's anus,
a man urinating into another's mouth, and a naked boy sitting next to a partially clothed
girl whose genitals were showing. Id. The prosecution struck prospective jurors who had
seen the exhibit, while the defense tried to remove those "inclined to put 'God's law'
before 'man's law.'" Id. The final jury, consisting of four men and four women who were
described as a college graduate and seven working class churchgoers, took only two
hours to deliberate before acquitting the exhibitors. Masters, Art Gallery Not Guilty of
Obscenity: Cincinnati Jury Clears Mapplethorpe Exhibitors of All Charges, Wash. Post,
Oct. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 4. One Cincinnati attorney commented, "[The result] shows that
human beings, even if drawn from a vacuum .... and who were about as homogenized
a jury as you can get, that they can learn something. . . .They learned what art is."
Wilkerson, Obscenity Jurors Were Pulled 2 Ways, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1990, at A12, col.
4. A juror later stated, "I'm not an expert. I don't understand Picasso's art. But I assume
the people who call it art know what they're talking about." Grundberg, Critic's Notebook:
Cincinnati Trial's Unanswered Question, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at C17, col. 3. Such a
reaction adds little to the analysis of community standards in obscenity cases and it calls
into question whether juror impartiality necessarily means juror ignorance.
173. The kinds of source lists vary among the states. Thirteen states require use of at
least voter registration lists. See ARK. STAT. ANN. S 16-32-103 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 40.01
(1988); LA. CODE CRim. PROc. ANN. art. 404.1 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. art. 404.1, S 8-104 (1989); MISS. CODE ANN. S 13-5-4, -8 (Supp. 1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. 5 3-15-301-402 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 500-A:l, 3 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS
S 9-9-1.1 (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. S 14-7-140 (Law. Coop. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. S 16-13-4.1 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-46-11 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
S 2.36.060 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 756.01 (West 1981). Four states rely on driver's
license and identification card lists. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, S 1252-A (Supp. 1990)
(also allowing qualified volunteers not appearing on either list); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
S 600.1304 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 593.37 (West Supp. 1991) (driver's
license only); OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, S 18 (1990). Eight states combine voter registration and
driver's license source lists. See CONN. GEN. STAT. SS 51-221, -222a (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 78, para. 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 29Ak-040 (Michie
Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 20A:70-4 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 38-5-3
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and federal law recommends their use for federal jury selec-
tion,174 but such a practice leaves nonvoters, particularly minori-
ties and young people, 175 underrepresented in the selection
(Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 9-2 (1986); OMO REV. CODE ANN. S 2313.06 (Anderson
Supp. 1989); TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. S 62.001 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (combining the two
sources only when a city is located in more than one county). Several states provide that
jury commissioners may supplement the required source list with other lists to promote
inclusion. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 12-16-57 (1986) (lists of taxpayers and utility customers);
VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-345 (Supp. 1990) (where feasible, lists of licensed drivers, county
and city directories, telephone directories, and personal property tax rolls may supplement
lists derived from voter registrants).
174. 28 U.S.C. S 1863(b)(2) (1988). Nevertheless, 28 U.S.C. S 1863 also allows the use of
"some other source or sources of names in addition to voter lists where necessary to
foster the policy and protect the rights secured by sections 1861 and 1862 of this title."
Id. Section 1861 provides that "all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered
for jury service" and that "grand and petit juries [shall be] selected at random from a
fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."
Id. 5 1861. Section 1862 prohibits the exclusion of prospective jurors "on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." Id. § 1862.
175. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION
IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1988 42, 46 (compared to 74% of persons in 45-to-54 age
group reported to be registered to vote, only 48% in 18-to-24 age group section reported
to be registered).
'In 1973, the Supreme Court dismissed, for lack of a substantial federal question, a
challenge to jury selection procedures that led to the disproportionate underrepresenta-
tion of young adults between the ages of 18 and 30. White v. Georgia, 414 U.S. 886,
dismissing appeal om 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849 (1973). The petitioner, a 24-year-old
white male, also challenged procedures leading to the underrepresentation of blacks and
women. Id. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court, however, summarily dismissed
these assertions as well. Id. at 886. In dissent, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall
linked young adults to blacks and women, whom the petitioner also claimed were
substantially underrepresented in the venire. See id. at 889-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Without explaining their reasoning, they argued that young adults constitute a "large,
identifiable segment of the community." Id. at 890 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although
adults from ages 18 to 30 composed 26.2% bf the eligible jurors of Coweta County,
Georgia, only 1.25% of the 400 names on that county's grand jury list were under 30.
Id. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
At the height of anti-Vietnam sentiment in 1970, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that young adults do have a sufficiently different outlook such
that attorneys should not without justification exclude them from juries. United States
v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1970). Nevertheless, the First Circuit reversed itself
15 years later in Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1050 (1986) ("[I]f the age classification is adopted, surely blue-collar workers,
yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an endless variety of other classifications will be
entitled to similar treatment").
Within a specific age range, experiences and values may be so divergent that no
commonality marks the group compared to ages just outside the group. For example,
within a group of 18- to 34-year-olds, the attitudes of those bordering each age limit may
be more similar to their closer respective limit than are the attitudes of those within the
purported group itself. In Barber, the First Circuit took judicial notice that 18- to 34-
year-olds exhibit "meaningful contrasts in such social indicators as their marital and
divorce rates, school enrollment and educational attainment, economic status, employment
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process.176 To alleviate this problem, other sources should supple-
ment voter lists, including vehicle registration lists, local taxation
lists, federal income taxation lists, public assistance lists, tele-
phone listings, and county and city directories. 177 If the clerk of
rate, criminality, ... and participation in the political processes." Id. at 998-99 (footnotes
omitted); see also Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1059 (1989) (holding that petitioner failed to submit any evidence that the purported
group aged "18 to 29 did not share[ ] any common attribute, other than their age");
United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 545 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988)
(citing Barber approvingly and holding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), did
not alter analysis of cognizability). Furthermore, unlike immutable race- and gender-based
groups, professed age-based groups are fluid and amorphous; no member is bound
permanently within a category, nor is he invariably subject to nonmembers' notions of
group bias. More practically, the more narrowly one defines the age group in an attempt
to establish group commonality, the more one weaves a tangled web of categories. See,
e.g., Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Ky. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 984
(1984) ("The terminal ages of 'young adults' defy definition, and we know of no end to
the maze that could be created by classifying jurors as young adults, middle-aged adults,
elderly adults, and on and on.").
For a comprehensive examination of young adults as a cognizable group, see Zeigler,
Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1045 (1978).
Zeigler argues that the knowledge persons of similar age acquire during childhood, those
persons' parallel developmental patterns, and societal segregation by age in the areas of
employment, education, and residency collectively shape perspectives unique to age strata.
Id. at 1075-76. Moreover, after comparing views among four age groups (18-30, 31-45, 46-
60, and 61-75) on such issues as presumed innocence, the defendant's refusal to testify,
and the guilt of one charged with several offenses, Zeigler concludes that young adults
tend to approach the criminal process less cynically than their elder counterparts. Id. at
1078-83.
176. See United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (D. Or. 1976) ("The voting
list is not the end sought but only the means used to ensure that all cognizable groups
within the populace are represented on juries. The voting list cannot be adequate if some
groups are significantly underrepresented, regardless of the cause."). Combining driver's
license and voter registration lists diminishes the underrepresentation resulting from the
exclusive use of either source. See Logan & Cole, Reducing Bias in a Jury Source List
by Combining Voters and Drivers, 67 JUDICATURE 87, 94 (1983). In Connecticut, a state
having a higher percentage of licensed drivers and registered voters than most states,
98% of those persons Logan and Cole randomly telephoned stated that they were either
licensed drivers, registered voters, or both; separately, 79% of the sample consisted of
registered voters, and 91/o consisted of licensed drivers. Id. at 89-90. Over 99% of
Connecticut households have telephones. Id. at 89.
Some critics have proposed the affirmative addition of minorities in the venire if their
representation within the original panel is disproportionately lower than their community
proportion. See supra note 148. Such a scheme, however, fails to address what should
transpire when a venire contains a disproportionate number of minorities compared to
their percentage in the community. Presumably, under the belief that an immutable
characteristic yields a certain perspective, those critics would have to concede that no
group can be overrepresented. Consequently, the excess would be removed solely because
of group affiliation.
177. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. S 13-71-107 (Supp. 1990) (voter registration lists and, as
the state supreme court so designates, licensed driver lists and other lists of persons
living in the counties); N.Y. JUD. LAW S 506 (Consol. 1983) (voter lists, utility subscribers,
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each circuit court annually revises this compilation, only those
who did not vote in the past year, do not "rive, own neither
taxable personal nor real property, do not receive any public
assistance but also do not work-or if they work do not pay
taxes, do not have a telephone in their name, and are not included
in a directory-will not be called to serve on a jury.178
Protecting the Interests of All Participants in the Process
In Batson v. Kentucky,179 Justice Powell noted that the harm
caused by discriminatory challenges extends beyond the defen-
dant himself to the prospective juror and to the community.180
Although the discrimination in Batson was based on race, a
classification traditionally examined with strict scrutiny, courts
should bar less invidious forms of discrimination affecting other
participants in the criminal process. 8' As between exclusions
based upon either race or gender, for example, some specific
explanation, unrelated to group bias, should support the exclusion
of either.182
licensed drivers, registered owners of motor vehicles, state and local taxpayers, and
qualified volunteers); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 4521 (West Supp. 1990) (voter lists, which
may be augmented by telephone and city directories, local taxpayer lists, public assistance
recipients, school census lists, and qualified volunteers); VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-345 (Supp.
1990) (voter lists supplemented by a list of persons issued driver's licenses, city or county
directories, telephone books, tax rolls, and other lists approved by the chief judge of the
circuit court).
178. If such potential jurors do exist, they could be perceived as adding an unparalleled
perspective to community diversity; more likely is the prospect that their social isolation
will add nothing to the fair cross section concept.
A shortcoming of this comprehensive compilation rests in the inherent inability to
select 18-year-olds when they are first eligible to serve. Presumably, some individuals of
that age would appear on lists of licensed drivers, but the person responsible for compiling
the source list would have the additional responsibilities of removing persons who have
not reached majority and of adding those who became eligible to serve in the interval
between annual revision of the source list.
179. 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
180. Id. at 87.
181. In Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), the Court did not go so far as
to state that jury service is a fundamental right, but the Court did hold denial of the
opportunity on racial grounds is no less invidious than denial of the right to vote. Id. at
330 (footnote omitted).
182. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (statutory exemption of women
from jury service, which serves to exclude their participation, had rational basis in 1961
because the "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life"); State v.
Hall, 187 So. 2d 861, 863 (Miss.), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 98 (1966) ("The legislature
has the right to exclude women so they may continue their service as mothers, wives,
and homemakers, and also to protect them ...from the filth, obscenity, and noxious
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William Blackstone wrote that the peremptory challenge will
more likely leave the defendant with "a good opinion of his jury,
the want of which might totally disconcert him."183 Although
exalting the peremptory challenge as a means of assembling an
impartial jury,18 the Supreme Court has overlooked the prospec-
tive juror's interest in not being arbitrarily removed during the
selection process, except in the case of race-based challenges.'"
The Court has failed to acknowledge that, on principle, discrim-
ination against anyone has no standing in a courtroom. Precon-
ceived notions of racial bias are more invidious than stereotypes
based upon mutable characteristics; the court impliedly tells the
struck juror, "You are not as competent to serve as someone of
another race," and the arbitrary removal suggests to the group
itself that its perspectives cannot contribute to the community's
voice. Nonetheless, any juror surviving a challenge for cause
should not be denied the opportunity to participate in the judicial
process merely because a lawyer's suspicion, shaped not by voir
dire but by his own intuition, prompts an irrational categorization
of the juror.186 Ironically, the protection of the prospective juror
lies in the peremptory challenge itself.
The mere license to remove a venireperson without explanation
does not necessarily indicate that the peremptory challenge is ar-
bitrary and capricious. Voir dire provides not only a means of dis-
covering actual or implied bias, but also a firmer basis upon which
the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges rationallyee
atmosphere that so often pervades a courtroom during a jury trial.").
For a summary of conflicting results regarding female jurors' predispositions, see
Sagawa, Batson v. Kentucky: WiW It Keep Womean on the Jury?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 14, 30-34 (1987-88).
183. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at 353.
184. See supra note 31.
185. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
186. Last Term, three white Howard Beach defendants presented this issue before the
Supreme Court. Contesting the trial judge's refusal to allow the defense to strike black
venirepersons peremptorily (the victims were black), the defendants petitioned the Court,
asking it "to strike the proper balance between the state constitutional right of prospec-
tive jurors and the petitioners' Federal constitutional right to a fair trial." People v.
Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
In holding that the defense may not discriminate in jury selection on the basis of race
under the New York Constitution, id. at 650-58, 554 N.E.2d at 1241-46, 555 N.Y.S.2d at
653-58, the court did not expressly balance the jurors' rights against the defendants'
right to the appearance of impartiality.
187. Several state courts have noted that voir dire gives counsel a "rational basis" for
exercising peremptory challenges. See, e.g., People v. Furman, 158 Mich. App. 302, 322,
404 N.W.2d 246, 255 (1987); Odom v. State, 355 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Miss. 1978); cf. Murry
v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 211 (Wyo. 1986) ("Before a peremptory challenge is made there
should be some rational basis to believe that the challenged juror's replacement would
be more suitable.").
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and intelligently.es A party who unsuccessfully challenges a juror
for cause nonetheless may have a specific, legitimate reason for
seeking a juror's removal.189 Given a predetermined number of
peremptories, a conscientious litigant will try to learn enough
about the venirepersons in order to discriminate rationally-not
based on stereotypes he brings into the courtroom. Voir dire
should provide the basis of neutral explanations unrelated to
stereotypical notions of group bias. For example, if defense coun-
sel moves to strike a low wage earner, only because the attorney
believes blue collar jurors favor personal injury plaintiffs,19 the
trial judge should refuse to remove him. If plaintiffs counsel
moves to strike a scrawny man only because he looks less
charitable than a portly juror, the trial judge should refuse to
remove him.' 91 A lawyer's hunch should not hinder a juror's right
188. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1916) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (voir dire "facilitate[s] intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges and...
help[s] uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for cause"); Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965) (because voir dire "tends to be extensive and probing, [it]
operat[es] as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories"); Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762,
766 (6th Cir. 1985) ("peremptory challenge ... supplement[s] the more stringently defined
challenge for cause"), affld, 801 F.2d 871, vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S.
1001 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); United States v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494, 1497
(10th Cir. 1983) ("Without an adequate foundation [laid by voir dire], counsel cannot
exercise sensitive and intelligent peremptory challenges."); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 274, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901 (1978) (merely because no reason need
be given does not mean that no reason exists; counsel will not "squander his peremptories
. . . simply because he has the right to do so").
189. Ultimately the party's reason may be a desire to win the case, but that rationale
fails to support a finding that the juror cannot deliberate impartially.
190. See B. COLSON, L. BLUE, & J. SAGINAW, JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY AND SCIENCE
SS 7.06-.07 (1986) (low income jurors empathize with civil plaintiffs, whereas wealthy
jurors favor civil defendants); R. WENKE, THE ART o SELECTING A JURY 64, 71 (2d ed.
1988) (occupation ranked as "extremely important" in evaluating juror; civil plaintiff
should avoid owners of small businesses and the self-employed). On the other hand,
[W]hat the prospective juror does for his living may not reveal how he really
feels .... Some of the great humanitarians are huge men who have strug-
gled up a little step at a time, while others, and there have been many of
these, were born with the proverbial silver spoon. The mere fact that a man
is in the business world and is financially fortunate, does not foreclose the
possibility that his heart is elsewhere, perhaps even with an injured plaintiff.
And contrariwise, simply because the prospective juror's job is aligned with
labor does not guarantee that his personal goals and experiences are not
consistent and sympathetic with the business world.
Spence, The Dynamics of Identification in Jury Selection or How You Lost Your Last Case
Without Even Knowing It: A New Approach to Voir Dire Examination, in JURY SELECTION
TECHNIQUES 60, 68 (G. Cooper ed. 1981) (National College for Criminal Defense).
191. As between two men, one gaunt and the other obese, mere weight should not
provide a rational basis to exclude either, Julius Caesar's paranoia to the contrary:
Let me have men about me that are fat
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to be considered as impartial as his peers. 19 2 When an "arbitrary
and capricious right" meets equal protection, the latter must
prevail.19s
To balance the interest of the prospective juror with the
parties' interest in an impartial jury, the judiciary or legislature
should replace peremptory challenges with a "neutral explana-
tion" test as articulated in Batson. 94 Under this plan, each side
may exercise as many challenges for cause as are warranted by
the responses evoked on voir dire. After challenges for cause,
the parties draft separate lists of names, 95 which designate in
the order of each party's preference those venirepersons who
should sit on the jury. Regardless of the order presented, those
venirepersons appearing on both lists will sit on the petit jury.'9
Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep o' nights.
Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look;
He thinks too much; such men are dangerous ....
Would he were fatter!
W. SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Iii. 199-202 (L. Wright ed. 1959) (1623). For more recent
stereotypes based on weight, see F. LANE, supra note 163, SS 9.45, 9.47 (endomorphs are
more generous to plaintiffs than are "lean, underweight, thin-lipped delicate type[s]"); T.
SANNITO & P. McGOVERN, COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY FOR TRIAL LAWYERS S 2.27 (1985)
("sympathetic indulger," preferable to plaintiffs, is "somewhat overweight"); V. STARR &
M. MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION S 12.2.2 (1985) (attorneys should be aware of stereotypical
traits accompanying somatotypes); W. WAGNER, ART OF ADVOCACY: JURY SELECTION
1.04[311g] (1990) (ectomorphs are "very tight about money in damage awards").
192. See, e.g., People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (1990) (hearing impaired juror is
not presumptively unqualified; person exercising challenge must at least have a rational
basis).
193. The intent here is neither to elevate acts of discrimination historically less
invidious than racial discrimination nor to trivialize race-based discrimination. See Alschuler,
The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Revim of
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 182 (1989) (issue is not whether other forms of
discrimination are as "bad" as racial discrimination but rather whether discrimination is
"bad" in principle).
Although in his dissent in Batson Chief Justice Burger vehemently objected to any
compromise of the peremptory challenge, he aptly defined the irreconcilable interests at
stake: "[U]nadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory
challenges exercised in any particular case. A clause that requires a minimum 'rationality'
in government actions has no application to 'an arbitrary and capricious right'...."
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
194. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
195. The number of names on the list should correspond to the number of jurors who
will sit on the jury.
196. Tracey Altman proposed this method, called "affirmative selection," in Note,
Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV.
781, 806 (1986), and Hans Zeisel endorsed the method in Zeisel, Affirmative Peremptory
Juror Selection, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1165 (1987).
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Their inclusion on both lists indicates that both parties have
confidence in their impartiality.
The remaining jurors, appearing only once between the two
lists, are subject to removal if, to the court's satisfaction, the
moving party provides a neutral explanation justifying their
dismissal. To monitor the use of such explanations as a pretext
for discriminatory challenges, 19' the trial judge should evaluate
similarities and differences between challenged and unchallenged
venirepersons to determine whether the explanation given com-
ports with a specific bias not shared by other panel members. 198
The court should conduct these challenges alternately, permitting
each side as many strikes as a system of peremptory challenges
would have allowed. If both parties exhaust their challenges and
the number of eligible jurors still exceeds the number of seats
remaining on the petit jury, the court should randomly select
from among the remaining venirepersons the number needed to
fill the petit jury. By this approach, the "neutral explanation"
test will provide all prospective jurors an equal opportunity to
sit as jurors.19 Subject only to random selection, no venireperson
is impliedly told, "You have demonstrated an inability to be fair."
When a court system couples this procedure with a more
comprehensive means of obtaining jurors from a range of com-
197. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Any prosecutor can easily
assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to
second-guess those reasons.").
198. The trial judge should be wary of counsels' attempts to isolate and alienate
venirepersons on voir dire under the pretense of eliciting the basis for challenges for
cause. Furthermore, by asking probing questions, counsel should not reap the benefit of
incurring a prospective juror's resentment, only to justify removal based upon what
counsel precipitated.
199. The most conspicuous difference between the approach espoused in this Note and
Ms. Altman's recommendation lies in the procedure following the judge's noting any
overlap between the two lists of names. Whereas with affirmative selection the court
fills vacant seats by taking, alternately and in descending order, the names on the two
lists until he has a full jury, see Note, supra note 196, at 806, this Note proposes that a
party may not remove a venireperson based solely upon the intuition that the prospective
juror will be partial to the other side. Furthermore, if Ms. Altman has assumed correctly
that each side will be able to choose those jurors it perceives as most sympathetic to its
case, the resulting jury will comprise three groups: those sought by both sides, those
purportedly partial to the prosecution (or plaintiff), and those seemingly sympathetic to
the defendant. Juror attitudes will not be as centrist as the result produced traditionally
when each side peremptorily strikes those venirepersons on each end of the spectrum;
on the contrary, affirmative selection may lead to a jury comprising radically different
and idiosyncratic viewpoints. Collectively the jury would be impartial, but in the absence
of the moderating voice between the two extremes, hung juries may be the inefficient
product. See 'i. at 808-10.
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munity backgrounds, a more inclusive, and potentially more rep-
resentative, body will debate the merits of a case. If the parties'
preferences overlap, they gain the satisfaction of knowing that
purportedly indifferent jurors are seated. Unique to this approach
is the protection afforded prospective jurors, who would other-
wise have only the safeguard of a self-interested party to pre-
serve his right to participate. 2°°
CONCLUSION
An archaic device which for centuries has severed from jury
panels divergent voices in the community, the peremptory chal-
lenge contravenes the goal of assembling a jury comprising a
spectrum of community experiences and perspectives. The prac-
tice perpetuates notions of group bias in an unlikely place, a
court of law. It inappropriately places the parties' desire to
manipulate the outcome over the venirepersons' right not to be
judged arbitrarily. By placing greater emphasis on the selection
procedures that precede the parties' attempts to manipulate the
jury and by curbing the parties' attempt to discriminate against
any qualified juror, the judiciary bolsters the integrity of the
trial process in the eyes of the community, allows the parties to
gain some sense of mutual control over the selection process, and
protects prospective jurors capable of deliberating impartially.
Only in this manner can the judicial process comply with consti-
tutional mandates of an impartial jury and equal protection under
the law.
Robert L. Harris, Jr.
200. To the extent that this method allows the choosing of jurors apparently compatible
with both parties, those not chosen by both parties are excluded without a rational basis.
Under this approach, the parties' mutual contentment derived from selecting, rather than
excluding, prospective jurors therefore outweighs the interest of those jurors who still
may serve on the jury.
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